MOVEit Transfer
CVE-2023-34362 was a SQL injection in MOVEit Transfer, a file transfer server companies expose to the internet. The CL0P ransomware gang exploited it before a patch existed, planted a web shell and stole stored files from many organizations.
- Affected
- MOVEit Transfer before 2021.0.6, 2021.1.4, 2022.0.4, 2022.1.5 and 2023.0.1
- Fixed in
- 2023.0.1 and the matching release of each line
- Published
- 2023-06-02
- Known exploited since
- 2023-06-02
What the flaw is
MOVEit Transfer built a database query from input the attacker controlled (SQL injection). An attacker with no account could read and change the database, then create an administrator and plant a web shell.
Spot it in the logs
Which request let the attackers in?
Progress and CISA point to a page named human2.aspx in the web root, imitating the real human.aspx; requests carrying an X-siLock-Comment header, the web shell's password; a new administrator named Health Check Service; and unusually large downloads.
How the attack works
- 1The attacker sends a request with a database query injected into it
- 2MOVEit runs the query against its own database
- 3The attacker makes themselves an administrator
- 4A web shell named human2.aspx takes the stored files
Why the MOVEit flaw was so severe
NVD scored CVE-2023-34362 9.8 out of 10 because it needs no account, no user click and only a web request. The attacker talks straight to the database behind MOVEit Transfer. Depending on the database engine (MySQL, Microsoft SQL Server or Azure SQL), they can learn how it is built, read its contents and run statements that change or delete data. From there, CISA and Mandiant describe the attackers creating an administrator account and installing a web shell, a small script on the web server that answers the attacker's commands.
The target made it worse. MOVEit Transfer is a managed file transfer product: companies use it to send large or sensitive files to partners over SFTP and the web. It sits on the internet by design and holds exactly the files an attacker wants, such as payroll, health and student records. Huntress, using the Shodan search engine, estimated over 2,500 servers exposed on the internet in early June 2023, and Unit 42 later counted at least 2,674 exposing their web interface. Mandiant saw data stolen within minutes of the web shell being installed in some cases.
The damage also spread through suppliers. Many victims never ran MOVEit themselves: a payroll firm, a benefits administrator or a software vendor did, and stored their data on it. Emsisoft, which tracked public disclosures, counted 2,773 organizations and 95,788,491 individuals affected as of June 28, 2024. It warns that some people are counted more than once and that most organizations never published a count, so the real total is uncertain. By sector, education (39.1%) and health (20.1%) were hit hardest, and 78.9% of known victim organizations were in the United States.
Is your version affected?
- Windows (PowerShell)
Get-Package -Name '*MOVEit Transfer*' | Select-Object Name, Version - Look for the web shell
Get-ChildItem C:\MOVEitTransfer\wwwroot -Filter 'human2.aspx'
Affected. Upgrade to 2023.0.1.
How to detect MOVEit exploitation
Progress, CISA, Mandiant, Huntress and Unit 42 published these checks for a MOVEit Transfer server.
- Read the IIS web logs for the attack sequenceIIS is the Windows web server MOVEit runs on. Huntress found POST requests to /guestaccess.aspx, then /api/v1/token, /api/v1/folders and /moveitisapi/moveitisapi.dll with action=m2, followed by GET /human2.aspx. Unit 42 adds the X-siLock-Transaction header values folder_add_by_path and session_setrvars in requests to moveitisapi.dll. Several POSTs to guestaccess.aspx from an unknown address before any web shell use is the pattern Mandiant described.
- Look for new files in the web root and ASP.NET foldersCheck C:\MOVEitTransfer\wwwroot\ (the path varies by install) for human2.aspx, _human2.aspx or other files with the human2 prefix; Unit 42 also lists h2.aspx variants. Progress says to check C:\Windows\TEMP\ for new folders holding .cmdline files, and the Temporary ASP.NET Files folder for App_Web_[random].dll files. One such DLL is normal; a second one suggests a compiled web shell.
- Watch the IIS worker processw3wp.exe is the process that runs the MOVEit web application, in the moveitdmz pool. Huntress saw it start csc.exe, the C# compiler, at the moment the web shell was created. Unit 42 flags w3wp.exe writing .aspx files or starting other child processes on a MOVEit server.
- Audit administrator accounts in the databaseLEMURLOOT creates administrators whose name is Health Check Service and can delete them again. CISA gives a query that lists active, non-deleted users with administrator permission (Permission=30) in the users table. Rebuilding the server without cleaning the database leaves these accounts in place.
- Check downloads and cloud storage accessReview MOVEit's own logs for unexpected or unusually large downloads from unknown IP addresses. If MOVEit uses Azure Blob Storage, check Azure logs for access to the storage keys and rotate them, because the web shell could read them. Mandiant saw most scanning and exploitation come from the 5.252.188.0/22 range, with theft from other systems.
- Run the published YARA rulesYARA rules match patterns inside files. CISA's advisory includes five, among them Mandiant's M_Webshell_LEMURLOOT_1 for the .aspx script and M_Webshell_LEMURLOOT_DLL_1 for the compiled DLL. They look for strings such as X-siLock-Comment, X-siLock-Step2, X-siLock-Step3 and Health Check Service. Mandiant notes they are meant for hunting, not for blocking in production.
Check a log line
Search the logs yourself
Find how the attacker got in and what they left behind.
Fix it, in this order
- 1Close the web door firstDeny HTTP and HTTPS to the server until it is patched. SFTP keeps working.
- 2Patch and remove their accountInstall the fixed release, then disable any administrator the attackers created.
- 3Remove the web shellQuarantine human2.aspx. Keep human.aspx: it is the real sign-in page.
Vulnerabilities related to MOVEit CVE-2023-34362
Timeline
- 2023-05-27CL0P starts exploiting the flaw, before any patch exists
- 2023-05-31Progress publishes its advisory and the fix
- 2023-06-02The CVE is published and CISA lists it as exploited
MOVEit attacks in the wild
The campaign is attributed to CL0P, a ransomware gang that CISA also tracks as TA505 and that Mandiant calls FIN11. MOVEit was not its first attack on file transfer software: CISA lists Accellion FTA servers in 2020 and 2021, with the DEWMODE web shell, and Fortra GoAnywhere MFT in January 2023 (CVE-2023-0669), where it claimed about 130 victims in roughly ten days. BleepingComputer also notes a 2021 campaign against SolarWinds Serv-U. In MOVEit the group did not encrypt systems. It stole data with the LEMURLOOT web shell, which could also pull the keys for Azure Blob Storage containers linked to MOVEit, and then demanded payment to keep the data off its leak site. CL0P told BleepingComputer it had breached hundreds of companies and gave them until June 14 to negotiate.
Some of the first public victims came through one supplier. On June 5, 2023, the UK payroll provider Zellis said its MOVEit server had been exploited, and British Airways, the BBC, Boots and Aer Lingus said staff data was taken. The BBC said this included staff ID numbers, dates of birth, home addresses and National Insurance numbers. Among the largest disclosures Emsisoft lists are Maximus (11.3 million people), Welltok (10 million), Delta Dental of California (6.9 million), the Louisiana Office of Motor Vehicles (6 million) and the Oregon Department of Transportation (3.5 million).
Governments were hit too. Security Affairs, citing CNN, reported that several US federal agencies were breached, including the Department of Energy, while CL0P claimed on its leak site that it had no government data. On June 16, 2023, the US State Department's Rewards for Justice program offered up to $10 million for information linking CL0P to a foreign government. Attempts did not stop after the patch: Unit 42 saw them rise again in July 2023, peaking at 1,639 on July 29.
How the MOVEit vulnerability came to light
The flaw was a zero-day: it was exploited before the vendor knew about it. Mandiant traced the first exploitation to May 27, 2023. Progress Software posted its advisory and fixes for every supported version on May 31, and the CVE was published on June 2, the same day CISA added it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. Kroll later reported evidence that the same attackers had been testing a working exploit against MOVEit servers as early as July 2021, with automated tests in April 2022 and again on May 15, 16 and 22, 2023.
Attribution came within days. On June 4, Microsoft linked the attacks to Lace Tempest, its name for the group behind the CL0P extortion site. On June 6, Mandiant merged its own tracking name, UNC4857, into the long-running FIN11 group, and CL0P posted on its leak site claiming responsibility. Researchers at Huntress rebuilt the attack chain, showed on June 5 that the SQL injection could lead to running code on the server, and their findings fed into a second CVE, CVE-2023-35036, which Progress patched on June 9.
Lessons from the MOVEit attacks
File transfer servers are a favourite target because one bug opens a store of other people's data. CL0P hit Accellion, Serv-U, GoAnywhere and then MOVEit, and Kroll's evidence suggests it held the MOVEit exploit for close to two years before using it. Progress's own best practices point at the defences that limit the damage: allow firewall and remote access only from trusted IP addresses, remove accounts nobody authorized, use certificates for inbound connections and turn on multi-factor authentication. Because the bug was unknown when the attacks began, logging and the hunting checks above mattered as much as the patch.
The second lesson is about suppliers. Most of the people affected never heard of MOVEit: their data sat on a vendor's server. Knowing which of your vendors move your files, and with what software, is part of an inventory. And patching was not the end: Progress told customers to delete web shells, remove unknown accounts, end all sessions, rotate service account and cloud storage keys, and then check again, because attackers could already be inside before the fix arrived.
The case
MOVEit: The Supplier Files
- Find what the advisory affects
- What did they do?
- Stop the theft
- Remove the web shell
Questions
What is human2.aspx?
The LEMURLOOT web shell the attackers planted, named to look like MOVEit's real human.aspx page. It answers only requests with the right X-siLock-Comment header.
Should I take MOVEit offline?
Progress advised blocking HTTP and HTTPS until patched, which keeps SFTP transfers working.
What is MOVEit Transfer?
MOVEit Transfer is a managed file transfer server sold by Progress Software. Organizations use it to exchange files with partners and customers over SFTP, SCP and web uploads. It usually faces the internet, which is why a flaw in its web application was so dangerous.
Has the MOVEit vulnerability been patched?
Yes. Progress released fixes for every supported version on May 31, 2023, and older 2020.0 and earlier versions had to be upgraded. Later fixes for CVE-2023-35036 and CVE-2023-35708 raised the recommended builds, so install the latest release for your version line rather than the first fix.
Who was behind the MOVEit hack?
The CL0P ransomware gang, which Microsoft calls Lace Tempest, Mandiant tracks as FIN11 and CISA links to TA505. It stole data rather than encrypting systems, then threatened to publish it on its leak site unless victims paid.
How many organizations were affected by MOVEit?
Emsisoft counted 2,773 organizations and about 95.8 million individuals as of June 28, 2024, based on breach notices, filings and the CL0P leak site. It warns that people affected through several organizations may be counted twice and that most victims never published a count.
How do I check if my MOVEit server was compromised?
Look for human2.aspx or similar files in the web root, extra App_Web DLLs, unknown administrators such as Health Check Service, and IIS log requests to guestaccess.aspx, moveitisapi.dll and human2.aspx. Also review large downloads and Azure storage key access. If you find any of these, treat the server as breached and follow Progress's cleanup steps.
Is the MOVEit vulnerability still a threat?
A server on a patched, supported release is not vulnerable to this flaw. Unpatched servers stayed under attack long after the fix, and a server breached before patching can still hold attacker accounts in its database. The stolen data also stays in criminal hands, so affected people remain at risk of fraud.